Utah State University

DigitalCommons@USU
All Graduate Plan B and other Reports

Graduate Studies

12-2022

Mountain States Oilseeds: Risk Management for Safflower
Production in the Intermountain West
Jameson F. Packer
Utah State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports
Part of the Agribusiness Commons

Recommended Citation
Packer, Jameson F., "Mountain States Oilseeds: Risk Management for Safflower Production in the
Intermountain West" (2022). All Graduate Plan B and other Reports. 1683.
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/gradreports/1683

This Creative Project is brought to you for free and open
access by the Graduate Studies at
DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in All Graduate Plan B and other Reports by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For
more information, please contact
digitalcommons@usu.edu.

Mountain States Oilseeds:
Risk Management for Safflower Production in the Intermountain West
Agribusiness Master’s Thesis
Jameson Packera
a

Graduate Student, Department of Applied Economics,
Utah State University, 4835 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322, USA

Abstract
Safflower is an oilseed crop primarily produced in the western Great Plains because of its
compatibility with cereal grain equipment. Varieties grown in that region are harvested
predominantly for seeds high in safflower oil and oleic acid that are processed and used in
cooking oil, human nutrition, and other health and beauty products (Bergman and Kandel 2019).
Safflower is also grown in Utah, Idaho, and California for birdseed mixes due to the region’s arid
climate, which yields a crisp, white seed that is highly favorable in the birdseed market (Godfrey
2022). Mountain States Oilseeds, headquartered in American Falls, Idaho, is one of the United
States’ largest processors of safflower seed and is the nation’s No. 1 supplier of safflower seed
used in birdseed mixes (Mountain States Oilseeds n.d.). While increasing demand for oilseeds
will bolster Mountain States Oilseeds’ business, producers often view safflower as a minor
annual crop with a high-risk profile and minimal expected returns. Thus, MSO must develop a
strategy to entice more dedicated oilseed production as resource constraints tighten across the
Western U.S. and the worldwide demand for safflower oil, birdseed, and meal continues to
expand.
Key Words: Agribusiness, contracting, oilseed, risk management, safflower
JEL Code: Q13, M10, C6
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1 Introduction
Jason Godfrey, the owner and president of Mountain States Oilseeds(MSO), sits at his desk at
the company’s headquarters in American Falls, Idaho, following a meeting with his fellow
leadership team. Oilseed processing has been a mélange lately. Consumer demand for processed
safflower seed products is currently high, but securing a steady supply of quality safflower seed
has been difficult.
War between Russia and Ukraine has heavily disrupted the supply chain by reducing the amount
of raw safflower seed available on global markets (USDA 2022a). Ukraine and Russia account
for approximately 89,287 tons of safflower seed (Selina Wamucii 2022a; Selina Wamucii
2022b). The war has also led to American farmers experiencing increased costs for fertilizer
manufactured in Eastern Europe. Hot weather and several years of drought grip the western U.S.,
and growers have been forced to rethink crop rotations and focus on allocating water to highvalue crops. These events have pushed raw safflower seed prices to an unprecedented 0.30 $/lb
in the United States (Godfrey 2022).
Early in its adoption stage, safflower was only produced by contracting with a processing plant.
As a niche specialty crop, finding buyers on the open market was nearly impossible, and demand
for safflower was driven primarily by oilseed processors. Since then, adoption has grown, and
just over 14.8 million lbs. of raw safflower seed were produced in Idaho in 2021 (USDA 2022b).
Mountain States Oilseeds contracts for most of the source that moves through its processing
facility. Jason is concerned that as the market has grown, opportunities for speculation on the
spot market have incentivized risk-tolerant growers to move away from contracts to try and
capitalize on slightly higher prices.
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Many farmers are skeptical of the economic feasibility of replacing traditional, familiar
enterprises with safflower, which has had historically thin margins when other small grains have
performed well. Traditional crop rotations within the region have consisted of corn or alfalfa
with wheat, barley, or triticale interspersed on years of soil regeneration. Jason is under pressure
to meet contracts that Mountain States Oilseeds has previously established with wholesalers and
retailers (Godfrey 2022). Without a stable flow of oilseed to the processing facilities, MSO will
not be able to meet its obligations and could lose important business.
Jason understands that many barriers keep producers from planting safflower and that world
economic and climate conditions play a significant role in dissuading farmer participation.
Together with his leadership team, Jason has determined that the production contracts MSO uses
could be rewritten to include contract mechanisms that would incentivize grower participation
and stabilize the company’s growing need for local safflower production. Jason now needs to
determine how to maintain MSO’s high-quality standards while appealing to safflower growers
by reducing risk.
2 History of Mountain States Oilseeds
In the early 1970s, a representative from Ag-Pro Associates named Lowell Cook came to the
American Falls region of Idaho looking to contract growers for sunflowers and safflower. One of
the growers he convinced to try these new oilseed crops was Bill Meadows, a relationship that
led to the first commercial production of safflower in American Falls. Unfortunately, during the
first year of production, the safflower crop received herbicide spray drift from a neighboring
field and struggled to produce much seed. However, the second year was successful, and storing
the oilseed onsite at the farm and then marketing it in the winter proved profitable for the new
crop.
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In the following years, safflower began slowly
growing in popularity because it used
equipment similar to cereal grains like wheat
and barley. Safflower also proved well suited
for the dry climate of the intermountain west.
The fourth year of production experienced
difficulties when Ag Pro Associates, the main

Figure 1: MSO Processing Facility (Unknown. Contact MSO).

contractor of Idaho-produced safflower, dissolved.
Despite this abrupt end to a relatively new crop contract in American Falls, a group of five
farmers in the area still desired to grow safflower because of its agronomic capabilities and
rotational benefits. After being denied by local grain elevators to handle and process their
safflower, the group contacted the Producers Cotton Oil Corporation in California, who agreed to
ship and sell Idaho-grown safflower.
When circumstances made it too challenging to organize efficient shipping of raw safflower
from all five farm locations, Bill Meadows offered a different solution. By converting some
property he owned along the railroad tracks and taking the responsibility as marketer and
assembler of the area’s safflower seed, the logistical problems of shipping to California were
resolved. Thus began Mountain States Oilseeds.
Mountain States Oilseeds initially worked in partnership with Oilseed International, a San
Francisco-based oilseed marketer, where MSO focused mainly on oilseed production and seed
allocation. At the same time, Oilseed International oversaw sourcing and international marketing.
Throughout this period, oilseed was primarily shipped to California, where it was processed and
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exported to Japan. During the late 1980s, MSO split away from Oilseed International to develop
its own marketing strategies and gain a foothold in the newly established birdseed market.
Since its inception in 1974, Mountain States Oilseeds has continued to grow and prosper. MSO
has introduced new production avenues through other oilseeds like mustard and flax. With more
seed varieties available and access to larger markets, MSO has become the number one oilseed
processor in the United States and one of the world’s largest exporters of safflower, mustard, and
flax. What began as a two-man operation has now grown to 15 employees and three locations
(Mountain States Oilseeds n.d.). GMO-free safflower seed is MSO’s primary product averaging
30 million lbs. per year. Belgium, Taiwan, and Mexico are the largest buyers of MSO exports
(Godfrey 2022).
MSO’s mission statement, “Farming for the 21st Century,” elucidates their desire to serve their
most important asset, growers (Mountain States Oilseeds n.d.). Their unique niche in the oilseed
and intermountain west communities is specifically targeted at providing new opportunities to
growers in an ever-changing agriculture marketplace and supplying nutritional foods for a
healthier diet and lifestyle to consumers worldwide.
3 Crop Overview
“Safflower (Carthamus tinctorius L.) is an annual thistle-like plant in the sunflower family. It is
native to Asia, the Middle East, and Northern Africa. Initially grown for dyes extracted from the
flowers to be used as a coloring in food and clothing, the predominant use is now for oil….”
(USDA 2016).

3.1 Uses and Cultural Practice Benefits
Safflower is harvested for three primary products: oil, meal, and birdseed (USDA 2016).
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Cultivated varieties are oleic or linoleic according to the type of fatty acids they produce. Seed
varieties high in oleic acid are harvested for use as a heat-stable cooking oil that is lower in
saturated fatty acids than olive oil and is helpful in the prevention of coronary diseases. Those
varieties high in linoleic acid are also used for human consumption in salad oils, and soft
margarine and as a primary ingredient in moisturizers, soaps, and other cosmetics.
As an animal feed, safflower has been valued for improving
performance and efficiency in sheep, beef cattle, and dairy
cattle. Though striped or partial hulls are higher in oil content,
bird enthusiasts prefer crisp, white seed, which is most
effectively produced in Utah, Idaho, and California due to the
Figure 2: Crisp, White Birdseed
(China Prairie. Safflower Power!).

region’s warm and dry climate (Bergman and Kandel 2019).

Though grown mainly for the food industry, new research and technological advancements are
developing cutting-edge products, particularly in Australia, focused on using safflower plant
matter in biodiesel and livestock forage applications.
A 2020 article published in the Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review provides compelling
evidence for safflower utilization in the biodiesel market resulting in “comparable fuel
properties, engine performance and emission parameters with those of diesel”(Yesilyurt 2020).
Immature safflower can also be grazed or stored as hay or silage material for livestock feed.
Under normal growing conditions, immature dry matter can yield up to 3 tons per acre with
acceptable fiber levels and crude protein of 8-10% (GRDC 2017). However, mature safflower is
composed of a woody stalk and spiny florets, dramatically diminishing edibility and deterring
livestock consumption.
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Safflower is particularly popular for dryland farming. As a taproot, it does well at extracting
moisture from the deeper layers of the soil, up to five feet, and is hardy in Idaho’s dry climate.
The deep taproot is exceptionally effective at using limited moisture and residual nutrients
throughout the soil profile. This contributes to many benefits for soil health, “including building
organic matter, improving soil tilth, and promoting water percolation throughout the soil”
(USDA 2016).
Safflower is used in rotation with other crops to help control grassy weeds like jointed goatsgrass. Safflower is immune to herbicides that kill both grass and wheat, making it useful in wheat
rotations to improve the effectiveness of chemical weed control mechanisms. The grass seed
lifecycle is interrupted in a wheat-safflower-fallow cycle, and no grass emerges after six years
(Pace et al. 2015).
Other benefits are noted by the Grains Research and Development Corporation as follows:
“Safflower can be used in rotations effectively to break the lifecycle of cereal root
diseases such as take-all and crown rot. It has an extensive root system, which can break
up hardpans and create channels in the soil profile, facilitating air and water movement.
The deep roots, combined with a long growing season, also dry soil at depth, which
benefits the management of soils prone to waterlogging and salinity”(GRDC 2017).

3.2 Crop Agronomics
Safflower has a strong, woody central stem supported by a deep taproot reaching depths of 8-10
feet in some regions. Various branches emerge from the woody stem, each producing one to five
florets containing up to 20 seeds per head. Flowers are generally yellow or orange, but some
have white or red flowers.
Page | 7

Depending on the planted variety and the growing conditions, seeds will have an oil content
ranging from 30-50%. Plants, on average, will grow between 12 and 24 inches in height on
dryland farms and 24 to 36 inches on irrigated ground. While tolerant of dry conditions, severe
drought or low soil moisture conditions during planting can severely stunt plant growth (Pace
and Creech 2015).

Figure 4: Safflower Taproot
(Unknown. “A Crop Profile…”
2016)

Figure 3: Immature Safflower Florets (Unknown. Growing
Safflower in Utah 2015).

In Idaho and Utah, nitrogen is the most limiting nutrient for safflower. However, because of its
deeper root depth, safflower can uptake nitrogen at 2-3 foot depths. Idaho soils typically have
sufficient potassium levels, and it is recommended that soil samples be taken at depths of 0”-12”
and 12”-36”, testing for nitrogen, phosphorus, and sulfur (Pace and Creech 2015).
A general rule of thumb for fertilizer application in safflower is that for every 100 lbs. of seed
planted, apply 5 lbs. of nitrogen (Pace et al. 2015). Fertilizer application is most effective when
deep-injected preplant or drilled during sowing. If safflower is planted after a legume, like
alfalfa, rather than cereal grains, required fertilizer amounts can be reduced substantially. Such
rotation practices would be highly relevant to the Intermountain region, where alfalfa is popular.
Safflower is typically sown between March and May, depending on environmental conditions
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and whether soil moisture will allow mechanical cultural practices to occur. The Agricultural
Extension at Utah State University recommends calibrating “seeding rates [at] 12 to 15 pounds
per acre on dryland and 20 to 25 pounds per acre on irrigated land”(Pace and Creech 2015).
Plants will begin to flower in late July, and harvesting can occur between mid-September and
October.

Figure 5: Stages of Safflower Development (Kaffka and Kearney 1998)

Safflower sees few insect problems that materially impact its economic performance. Cutworms,
wireworms, and grasshoppers are the most significant source of damage, with the latter posing
the most common risk in Utah and Idaho.
Except in years of extensive rainfall or periods of high humidity, safflower experiences few
disease problems. When exposed to long-term moisture, the crop can fall prey to Alternaria leaf
spot, which minimizes the plant's photosynthetic capacity and reduces yields.
4 Markets and Supply Chain
Global safflower consumption is proliferating, and the raw seed market is expected to reach a
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Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 5.7% by 2025 (Mordor Intelligence 2021). As of
2020, the United States is one of the top five producing countries, by tonnage, of raw safflower
(Fig. 6), with more than 50% of production occurring in California. While popular among the
Great Plains states such as Montana and the Dakotas, demand for safflower birdseed varieties
grown in the Intermountain West has grown substantially over the past several years (Bergman
and Kandel 2019).

4.1 World Safflower Production
In 2020, the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) estimated
world safflower production at
approximately 756,663 tons.
Safflower was produced in 17
countries led by Kazakhstan,
Russian Federation, Mexico,

Figure 6: (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 2020)

the United States, and India. These top five growing nations combine to make 76 percent of the
world’s safflower output (FAO 2020).
World safflower production experienced a decreasing trend from 732,524 tons in 2010 to
645,243 tons in 2019. As noted previously, 2020 saw a production increase of more than 100,000
tons. However, the FAO has yet to release production values for 2021 and 2022, which are
expected to be much lower due to decreased production from war-torn Russia and Ukraine (FAO
2020).
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4.2 National Import and Export Markets
In 2020, 18 percent of world safflower oil, or approximately 124,585 tons, was traded on the
international market. The United States imported about 18,209 tons of safflower oil, accounting
for roughly 18 percent of total U.S. production (Table 1) and 15 percent of total world safflower
oil imports in 2020. The top three importing countries of safflower oil were Poland, the United
States, and the Netherlands. These three countries account for over 85 percent of world safflower
oil imports (FAO 2020).
In 2020 the United States exported about 11,768 tons of safflower oil, accounting for
approximately 16 percent of total United States production (Table 1) and 32 percent of total
world safflower oil exports. Mexico was the world’s leading exporter of safflower oil, followed
by the United States and the Netherlands. Combined, these three countries accounted for
approximately 90% of world safflower oil exports in 2020 (FAO 2020).

Table 1. Historical United States Safflower Production
Harvested
Average Yield
Total
Year
Acreage
(lbs/acre)
Production (lbs)

Average
Price ($/lb)

Value of
Production

2016

152,700

1,432

218,625,000

$0.21

$45,170,000

2017

145,200

1,212

176,025,000

$0.19

$32,725,000

2018

156,300

1,512

236,270,000

$0.20

$47,976,000

2019

151,500

1,273

192,900,000

$0.20

$38,335,000

2020

128,400

1,185

152,125,000

$0.22

$32,844,000

2021

135,000

1,001

135,175,000

$0.26

$34,418,000

Note: Price represents the price paid to producers for raw safflower seed, nominal values (NASS Quickstats 2021)
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4.3 Local Safflower Market
In addition to farmers in other countries, Idaho safflower producers must compete with other
states for the safflower market. United States safflower acreage and production quantities are
reported sporadically by the state, and Idaho data are only reliable from about 2016 onward.
California is noted by Mordor Intelligence as the dominant producer of safflower in 2021,
accounting for 50 percent of the planted safflower acres (Mordor Intelligence 2021).
On average, Idaho accounts for approximately 11 percent of total U.S. safflower production. The
area harvested for safflower has nearly doubled from 17,500 acres in 2016 to 31,500 in 2021
(Table 2). Because of prolonged drought, total pounds of raw safflower grown in Idaho have
declined recently. For example, despite having similar harvested acreage in 2019 and 2021, the
average yield per acre has dropped by 50 percent.

Table 2. Historical Idaho Safflower Production
Harvested
Average Yield
Total
Year
Acreage
(lbs/acre)
Production (lbs)

Average
Price ($/lb)

Value of
Production

2016

17,500

850

14,875,000

$0.17

$2,529,000

2017

21,500

900

19,350,000

$0.18*

$3,895,500*

2018

21,000

830

17,430,000

$0.17

$2,928,000

2019

28,500

940

26,790,000

$0.18

$4,929,000

2020

26,500

880

23,320,000

$0.20

$4,687,000

2021

31,500

470

14,805,000

$0.23

$3,390,000

Note: *Data was unavailable; the ten-year Utah average was substituted (NASS Quickstats 2021)
Price represents the nominal value paid to producers for raw safflower seed.
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Table 3. Historical Utah Safflower Production
Harvested
Average Yield
Year
Acreage
(lbs/acre)

Total
Production (lbs)

Average
Price ($/lb)

Value of
Production

2016

13,500

810

10,935,000

$0.18*

$1,968,300*

2017

16,500

900

14,850,000

$0.18*

$2,673,000*

2018

13,000

840

10,920,000

$0.16

$1,769,040

2019

12,700

1,050

13,335,000

$0.17

$2,280,285

2020

22,000

820

18,040,000

$0.19

$3,427,600

2021

16,000

460

7,360,000

$0.22

$1,582,400

Note: *Data was unavailable; the ten-year average was substituted (NASS Quickstats 2021)
Price represents the nominal value paid to producers for raw safflower seed.

Mountain States Oilseeds has an extensive area of operation (Appendix B). Utah provides a
significant portion of the raw safflower seed processed at MSO. Table 3 includes historical
values relevant to MSO’s strategic planning. Utah accounts for approximately 5 percent of total
U.S. production.
4.4 Current Market Volatility
Global oilseed markets during 2021-2022 have vacillated because of the war between Russia and
Ukraine. Russia plays a critical role by supplying approximately 14 percent of the world’s
safflower seed (Fig. 6). Uncertainty prevails, and it is difficult to know exactly how severe the
reduction in global oilseed production will be as a result of the war.
Predictions call for rising prices as demand increases for safflower products, and the raw seed
supply dramatically shifts. However, increasing costs for fertilizer formulated in Eastern Europe
could offset the positive price effects. Owing to the current havoc being wreaked upon the
oilseed market, it will be critical for Mountain States Oilseeds to evaluate whether recent market
shocks will completely shift the long-run market or their impact will be temporary.
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5 Literature Review
This study has a connection with two main threads of academic literature. The first thread
involves articles and studies that examine the relationship between food production/marketing
contracts and risk management. Intuitively, contracts are important for shaping and sharing risk
between producers and processors. However, this study argues that it is essential to engage in
contracts that do more than generically address the systematic risk that is inherent in agriculture.
Instead, to precisely identify the risks of the most significant magnitude that both parties can
control. The second thread is the studies using capital budgeting techniques to model the
economic and agronomic benefits of enterprise diversification into the oilseed industry.
Very few studies appropriately address safflower economics and even fewer investigate the
utility and limitation of contracts within the safflower economy. Ironically, nearly all safflower
grown in the United States is under contract, yet little empirical analysis has been conducted to
evince appropriate and effective contract mechanisms. Medical research studies primarily
address the benefits of safflower products with little reference to the span between farm
production and fork consumption.
5.1 General Approach to Agricultural Contracting
While there are no readily available resources for structuring safflower contracts, much has been
done regarding vegetables, hogs, poultry, and sugar beets which are all saturated with contract
production. Schieffer and Vassalos (2015) suggest that while a critical risk management
mechanism, contracts should be viewed more broadly as a tool to help coordinate activity and
manage the producer-buyer relationship.
Vavra (2009) also approached contracting from a broader perspective, concluding that the
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popularity of agricultural contracts is strongly tied to consolidating markets and frequent changes
in technology and consumer demand. Furthermore, he explored the additional complexity of
governmental regulation and policymaking related to production and marketing contracts.
Allen and Lueck (1995) sought to bridge the gap between contract theory and the realities of
agricultural production, as noted by George J. Stigler: “[Such theories] have been a convenient
crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down…They give the appearance of considered
judgment, yet really have ad hoc arguments that disguise analytical failures.”
Later they employed a utility model to illustrate the importance of how the time-honored risksharing paradigm of traditional contract theory could be shaped by the principal’s attitude toward
risk and, thus, how contract structure could be influenced under risk-averse conditions (1999).
Allen and Lueck were some of the first to address the appropriate use of empirical analysis in
agricultural contracts to prove contract theory.
5.2 Capital Budgets and Simulation Modeling
Yeboah et al. (2013) conducted an economic feasibility study using capital budgeting techniques
programmed in @Risk simulation software to evaluate the ten-year NPV and sensitivity of
oilseed biodiesel production. Similarly, Yesilyurt et al. (2020) published a comprehensive review
of the potential for biodiesel production using safflower feedstock.
In analyzing project returns under conditions of uncertainty, Reutlinger (1970) proposed using
probability distributions to estimate the net present value of an investment. Outlaw et al. (2007)
described the net present value (NPV) as a good measure for determining the overall economic
feasibility of a proposed investment. Richardson and Mapp (1976) described the probability of
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economic success as the probability that the NPV is greater than zero, with the reason that if the
NPV>0, then the investment will yield a return (IRR) that exceeds the investor’s discount rate or
opportunity cost of capital.
Wilson and Dahl could be considered the modern-day Allen and Lueck regarding empirical risk
analysis in the grain and oilseed markets. They employed @Risk to simulate alternative
contracting strategies in Durum wheat using various pricing features and explored contract
terms, analyzing them in terms of risk and return to growers using stochastic efficiency with
respect to a payoff function (2011).
Wilson and Dahl (2013) also simulated grower returns and processor gross margins for
alternative contracting strategies in canola production. Strategies of no contract, fixed price with
and without an act of God provisions, and an oil premium contract were studied, and the
resulting distributions were evaluated for stochastic efficiency. Payoff functions were defined for
growers and processors that modeled the risks and returns for the accompanying pre-plant
contract provisions.
5.3 Beyond the NPV: Agronomic Benefits
Smith and Jimmerson (2005) detail the economic viability of safflower resulting from its deep
taproot system that gives the plant significant drought tolerance. The root system is also
beneficial in wet and saline soils as the taproot opens the ground allowing airflow and surplus
water movement, which promulgates low-cost, practical reclamation opportunities.
The Grain Research and Development Corporation (2017) released a safflower crop overview,
stating, “As an oilseed crop, benefits include improved productivity of subsequent crops, lifting
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farm income, reducing the impact of disease and weeds; and producing edible and industrial
quality oil and meal. Safflower integration offers the opportunity to enhance overall
environmental, production, and economic sustainability.”
Though little research has addressed the intricacies of risk management and contracting in the
safflower industry, lessons learned in other agricultural endeavors can be suitably applied to the
case at hand. Contracts have provided clear communication in many areas, cost-benefit analyses
over time have been conducted on safflower products and competing oilseeds, and both
economic and agronomic benefits provide incentives for the continuation of the principal-buyer
framework.

6 Conceptual Framework- The Role of Contracting
“Consumers will usually choose the finished good produced by the most efficient vertical
chain”(Besanko et al. 2017). Therefore, a critical management strategy must determine a firm’s
vertical boundaries; whether a business should perform an activity itself or outsource to another
company. MSO has established its vertical boundaries by relying on independent growers to
produce raw safflower seed under contract.
In order to manage the “buy” strategy employed by MSO, agricultural production contracts are
used to list the set of tasks that each contracting party expects the other to perform. Such details
may include the best management practices expected of the producer, identifying the
commodity’s quality, quantity, and payment method, and outlining the acquisition and use of
resources. Contracts also specify the course of action one party may take to remedy a situation
where the other party fails to meet its obligations.
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Defined: “an agricultural production contract is a legally binding agreement of a fixed
term, entered before production begins, under which a producer agrees to sell or deliver
all of a specifically designated crop raised on an identified number of acres in a manner
set in the agreement to the contractor, and is paid according to a price or payment
method, and at a time, determined in advance” (Hamilton 1995).
Farms do not operate under climate-controlled conditions. Impacts of weather, regulation,
disease, and management decisions on quality and prices make agricultural products much more
dynamic than goods produced in industrial manufacturing facilities. In moving agricultural
commodities from farm to fork, these spastic and unpredictable conditions expose both growers
and processors to risks.
Farming income is risky because it depends heavily on circumstances and conditions that are not
easily controlled. Prices and output may fluctuate widely while black swan events lurk in
undisclosed shadows only to appear and wreak havoc at the worst possible moments. As
previously noted, the unexpected war between Russia and Ukraine has substantially changed the
safflower market- both the prices and the expected global supply of safflower.
Risks matter in safflower contracting because some farmers are risk-averse and will view the
production of the narrow-margin crop as a huge gamble. Many farms are also under pressure
from recurring financial obligations and other planning and investment decisions. “When farmers
try to avert risks by modifying production practices—changing their use of inputs such as
pesticides or fertilizer, or altering cropping patterns—they affect prices, incomes, and input
usage patterns” (MacDonald et al. 2004).
Despite contracts being the most widely used method in coordinating safflower production, they
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can lead to power or information imbalances between the parties. There is potential for
monopsony power when there are few buyers of raw safflower seed. Often, processing firms will
propose a printed contract that vigorously protects the interests of the processing facility and
exhibits a take-it-or-leave-it mentality where there is little room for growers to negotiate terms.
However, such domineering can keep farmers from participating in the contract, and ultimately,
processors may lose valuable business with wholesalers and retailers. It is essential that
processing facilities draft contracts that contain mechanisms protecting the facility while
incentivizing grower participation as a mutual beneficiary.
The effects of unobservable efforts on contractual efficiency can be complex. Contracts cannot
entirely eliminate processor risk without eliminating the risk-sharing incentive for a farmer to
participate. Similarly, protecting the producer from the consequences of risk may increase the
participation incentive, but it also increases the opportunity for moral hazard. Shirking can occur
when one party has no stake in the final result.
To minimize the opportunity for shirking, the elements of a complete contract should be
observed: (1) the contract must be able to contemplate all relevant contingencies and agree upon
a set of actions for every contingency. (2) what constitutes satisfactory performance must be
measurable. (3) the contract must be enforceable (Besanko et al. 2017). Not every contingency
can feasibly or economically be named and quantified; consequently, contracts are burdened by
bounded rationality, difficulty specifying or measuring performance, and asymmetric
information.
For a producer, contracts are beneficial as a risk management tool to reduce the inherent risks of
production through risk sharing. Contract-based production offers several other benefits, such as
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higher profits, lower costs, and improved uniformity.
For agribusinesses like MSO, contracts improve the consistency and predictability of processing
outcomes while reducing the risk of high expenditures by allowing a company to lock in a
guaranteed supply to meet third-party obligations. Contracts also provide a legal means of
recourse that is handled orderly and outline a clear path if either party fails to fulfill its
obligations. For the consumer, “contracts can lead to reduced processing costs and provide
consumers with more customized and affordable products” (MacDonald et al. 2004).
7 Analyzed Payment Structures
Production contracts can be as diverse and varied as the individuals they apply to. This project’s
scope does not include an in-depth analysis of contract law beyond how it can be applied
generally to production contracts used in the U.S. safflower market. It was made known in
section 5, “Literature Review,” that while models attempting to illustrate the impact of
contracting on risk profiles have been done, it has not been deeply explored in safflower.

The primary hypothesis explored in this model postulates that price volatility is the most
influential factor determining a grower’s willingness to participate in a production contract for
safflower. Contract structures that address risk beyond price volatility are only minimally
considered. Thus, four standard payment methods were selected to model how the producer's risk
profile of expected dollar-per-acre revenue and dollar-per-ton revenue for the processor changes
under the stipulated payment conditions.

7.1 Spot Market
The spot market is a financial market where commodities, including safflower seed, are traded
for immediate delivery. “Delivery refers to the physical exchange of the commodity with a cash
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consideration. The spot market is also known as the cash market or physical market because cash
payments are processed immediately, and there is a physical exchange of assets” (CFI Team
2022). This market is typically the most volatile, and price discovery is more complicated. There
is the potential to capitalize on high prices, but there is a more significant probability of
downside risk and loss. Using the spot market rather than a production contract fully exposes the
producer to downside price risk and the processor to upside price risk.
7.1.1 Contract Characteristics
•

Transactions are settled at the spot price or the current market rate.

•

Delivery of the assets takes place immediately.

•

Transfer of funds is instantaneous.

•

Price is not fixed until assets exchange hands; higher probability of negative returns.

7.2 Fixed Price Performance Payment
A contract mechanism often used in oilseed markets where contracts are created at the beginning
of each year, and the processor and the producer agree upon price per lb. By fixing the price,
downside price volatility is removed from the grower, and the risk of their profit function hinges
upon cost and yield risks instead. The processor may, however, impose quality constraints in the
contract that allow some price adjustment for yields that do not meet the quality standard.
Fixed price payments are popular because they eliminate downside price risks, and the producer
can estimate end-of-year revenues more predictably by yield. Conversely, significant market
price changes can render contracts untenable for one party. During periods of low market prices,
the processor may have a solid incentive to void or renege on the contractual commitment, while
the inverse is valid for the producer in times of high market prices.
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7.2.1 Contract Characteristics
•

Simple and clear, the price to be paid/received is known early in the year.

•

Shared risk profile.

•

May require additional contract mechanisms to meet quality requirements.

•

Higher chance of renegotiation if prices experience much movement.

7.3 Indexed Price Performance Payment
Safflower does not have a futures market, and price discovery is difficult. Using an indexed
payment, one can easily estimate safflower prices given a historical average or standardized price
indexed against a commodity with more information transparency. This project indexes
safflower prices against wheat prices, considering that most farms in Utah and Idaho will likely
replace dryland wheat production with safflower when making the enterprise change.
Rather than establishing the price at the beginning of the year as in a fixed price contract,
indexed prices can move with correlated changes in other commodities. In a sense, price
renegotiation is fundamentally built into the contract such that neither party is incentivized to
breach the contract because of changes in the market.
Some such agreements also establish high and low thresholds beyond which the contract cannot
go, thereby giving flexibility for price adjustments in the market yet still protecting either party
from downside risk. This project models an indexed price performance payment structure
without bounds. The concept of a bounded index payment structure is further addressed in
Section 11.
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7.3.1 Contract Characteristics
•

Flexibility allows prices to move, improving the profit potential for both parties.

•

More downside risk without thresholds.

•

Prices are tied to other commodities, so market shifts are much more impactful.

•

Price is tied to performance indicators, and renegotiation risk is minimized.

7.4 Combination Lump Sum and Fixed Price Payment
Rather than determining revenue only as a function of price times quantity of the commodity
produced, the lump sum payment is paid on a per-acre basis. Whether delivered yearly or as an
establishment payment, this contract provides revenue to the producer regardless of the field’s
performance.
Its appeal comes when periods of low planted safflower acreage jeopardize the quantity of raw
safflower seed entering the mill. Acreage payments can also promote oilseed production by
drawing farmers who have not previously rotated safflower by providing a percentage of
guaranteed income.
Price and yield risks are removed from the producer and transferred to the processor. As a
processor, the firm may take on more risk, especially when moral hazard is created because the
acreage payments are not tied to performance objectives. However, lump sum payments are
effective at pushing more acreage into safflower production, thereby increasing the odds of
having a sufficient seed supply.
Since a strict lump sum contract mechanism violates the moral hazard constraint held by
Mountain States Oilseeds, this project introduces a combination contract mechanism that pays a
10 percent fixed acreage payment of $24.72 per acre and then pays the farmer a fixed price of
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$522.67 per ton thereafter. Furthermore, the contract is structured such that the producer payoff
is reevaluated at the end of the year once yields are known. MSO can scrutinize growers who
yield less than the expected average of 0.41 tons per acre to determine whether a new contract
will be enacted for the following year. An additional payment is made to farmers who experience
yields greater than the expected average, thus incentivizing best management practices.
7.4.1 Contract Characteristics
•

Reduces price and yield risk for the grower.

•

Can shore up safflower production when the expected production acreage is low.

•

Simple and direct structure that can be adjusted with other mechanisms.

•

Can inadvertently create situations of asymmetric information and moral hazard.

8 Quality Adjustments
MSO supplies non-GMO safflower to retailers and wholesalers. Thus, any seed entering the
facility must also comply with non-GMO standards. Planted seeds must be GMO-free, and the
harvested oilseed must be free from GMO contamination by other crops and cultural practices.
The land should be clean and free of trash and debris. All equipment and storage facilities should
be cleaned appropriately during all phases of the safflower production period to avoid any food
safety liability.
To help reduce the risk of contamination, growers who contract with MSO must either purchase
seed previously inspected by MSO or use seed provided by MSO for that purpose. Moreover,
appropriate multi-year crop rotation practices should be followed to protect the crop from other
GMO crops, contamination, cross-pollination, and inseparable seeds.
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Safflower seed contracted and shipped to MSO must also comply with the moisture and dockage
requirements as outlined in Table 4. Using a quality scale to monitor moisture and dock material
within the incoming safflower loads reduces the amount of waste and cost at the processing
plant. Raw seed with high moisture levels, excessive dirt, or dockage must undergo drying and
cleaning procedures before the seed is ready for processing.

Prospect Theory suggests that “when choosing

Table 4. Safflower Quality Deductions
Safflower Cleaning Charges by Short Ton (ST)

among several alternatives, people avoid losses
and optimize for sure wins because the pain of
losing is greater than the satisfaction of an
equivalent gain” (Harley 2016). In other words, a
method of impending price reductions for a lowquality product is much more effective than the
inverse method of premium additions to achieve
that same quality.
Decreasing the price paid per ton for safflower

Total
Dockageincludes
other
grains and
sprouts

Cleaning
Charge

Moisture

Discount

0.00-5%- No charge, but 8.0-9.0%- No charge
all dockage will be
but subject to
deducted from the gross
acceptance by MSO
inbound weight
5.1-6%
$8.00/ST
9.1-10%
$6.00/ST
6.1-10%
$10.00/ST
10.1-11% $12.00/ST
10.1-12% $12.00/ST
11.1-12% $18.00/ST
12.1-15% $15.00/ST
12.1-13% $24.00/ST
15.1-17% $18.00/ST
Any seed in excess of
17.1-19% $22.00/ST
13% moisture will
19.1-21% $25.00/ST
only be accepted by
21.1-22% $28.00/ST
negotiation.
All charges are against gross inbound weights.
Note: For more information, see “Appendix F”

seed below the preferred quality thus galvanizes farmers to ameliorate their efforts. Producers
also gain access to MSO crop advisors and other professionals through the contract, who can
calibrate farm equipment before harvest to achieve optimal quality. By using a production
contract strategy, MSO can more easily adhere to the quality and GMO constraints of
wholesalers and retailers to fulfill its consumer obligations downstream.
9 Model and Methods
A stochastic cost-benefit model was developed to test how different payment mechanisms
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influence the total risk profile for growers and processors of safflower. The price payoff function
is a mechanism-based model that incorporates the dynamic elements of safflower production by
simulating price uncertainty, cost fluctuation, and crop yield predictions that more accurately
reflect the relationship between the price received by farmers and the overall riskiness of the
enterprise.
While the model only evaluates cashflows for one year of safflower production, discounted
future cashflows are incorporated to differentiate the time value of money for cashflows
occurring at the beginning and end of the contract period. Several benefits arise from this model
assumption, including enabling objective comparison. Comparing payoff values across varying
companies, investments, and objectives becomes much more accessible, giving consistent
valuation across many scenarios. In this case, only a few contract designs are considered.
However, there is a practical use for this compatibility as research continues and future projects
begin to evaluate safflower as a substitute relative to other cash crops.
Two, the assumption of discounted future flows assays the passage of time between initial
planting when costs are primarily incurred and harvesting, when payment is finally received.
Discounted flows provide a means to account for and quantify the uncertainty when a farmer
first makes his planting decision and enters a contract with MSO at the start of the year.
Because safflower historically has had such thin margins, the production risks between planting
and harvest become much more poignant as a farmer considers his enterprise budget.
Three, a discounted cashflow model allows for improved sensitivity analysis where changes in
the stochastic elements of the model over time can be appraised for their impact on the final
expected payoff value. This is perhaps the most compelling advantage of using discounted
cashflows because the specific contract payment mechanisms evaluated in this study become
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particularly impactful when gauged by their ability to mitigate downside risk and improve the
level of producer risk exposure given marginal changes in the most sensitive variables.
For the model, price and yield data were obtained from the USDA database for the past 20 years
of safflower production on average across the U.S. Data specific to Idaho is sporadic at the
writing of this paper; therefore, price and yield were adjusted by an average basis percentage to
account for geographical differences calculated from the available data for both regions. Costs
were retrieved from the 2019 USU Extension safflower crop budget and modeled stochastically
under a triangular distribution (Pace et al. 2019).
All simulated mechanisms are evaluated relative to the spot market model. This includes the
constraint imposition that all simulated contract payments are first standardized to $600.00 and
then transformed by the individual mechanisms, thereby giving clear interpretations of changes
to the risk profile and expected NPV payoff function for either party.

It was assumed that yields, costs, and other influencing factors are not significantly impacted by
entering a contract. Casaburi et al. (2014) and Arouna and Michler (2021) both attempted to
disclose the relationship between agricultural productivity and contract farming, but both focused
on farm systems in rural, foreign scenarios. MSO believes productivity is far more correlated
with producer characteristics than contractual obligations and does not collect primary data on
this issue (Godfrey 2022). Little empirical or anecdotal evidence is available to suggest enhanced
complexity; therefore, to abide by the principle of Ockham’s Razor, this model implements the
same stochastic costs and yields ceteris paribus across all contract types such that marginal
changes in risk or NPV can be specifically attributed to the simulated payment mechanism.
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9.1 Grower Payoff Functions
For growers, the payoff functions were defined as net present value returns per acre over one
year. Grower payoffs according to payment mechanism alternative were defined as follows for
spot market or no contract (Eq. 1), fixed price performance payment (Eq. 2), indexed price
performance payment (Eq. 3), and a combination lump sum and fixed price payment (Eq. 4). It is
assumed that producers have available acreage and the appropriate equipment to participate in
this enterprise.
(1)
𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡) = ∑ [
𝑇=1

((𝑃𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ) − 𝐶𝑇 )
] − (𝐶𝑇−1 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

where:
PT is the expected safflower price per ton using a fitted normal distribution with 𝜇 $600.00 per
ton and 𝜎 $106.01. YT is the expected safflower yield tons per acre following an independent
draw from a fitted extreme value minimum distribution with 𝜇 0.41. and 𝜎 0.055. MfT is the
moisture fee deducted for raw safflower with high moisture content that is received at the MSO
facility. This fee follows an independent draw from a triangular distribution with a minimum of
$0 and a maximum of $24 per ton with a most likely value of $0. DfT is the dockage fee deducted
for raw safflower dockage, other seed, and dirt content in raw safflower received at the MSO
facility. This fee follows an independent draw from a triangular distribution with a minimum of
$0 and a maximum of $28 per ton with a most likely value of $0. CT is the expected cost per acre
incurred at the end of the period. Costs at time T follow an independent draw from a normal
distribution with 𝜇 $102.77 and 𝜎 $9.51. CT-1 is the expected cost per acre incurred at the
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beginning of the period that is not discounted. Costs at time T-1 follow an independent draw
from a normal distribution with 𝜇 $81.96 and 𝜎 $7.30. Cost distributions were fitted to the USU
Extension crop budget. Each line item was modeled stochastically as triangular distributions with
min -50 percent and a max of 50 percent variation from the given budget value. Most likely cost
values are the expected costs as expressed in the enterprise budget. r is the discount rate fixed at
15 percent for the producer. T is the number of cash flow periods equal to 1 in this model.
(2)
𝑛

(((𝑃𝑓𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ) − 𝐶𝑇 )
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇) = ∑ [
] − (𝐶𝑇−1 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
𝑇=1

where:
𝑃𝑓𝑇 = $600.00 fixed price per ton. All other variables, as defined in Eq. 1.

(3)
𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇) = ∑ [
𝑇=1

(((𝑃𝑠𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ) − 𝐶𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

] − (𝐶𝑇−1 )

where:
𝑃𝑠𝑇 = (𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗

𝑃𝑤𝑇
)
𝑃𝑤𝑇−1

PsT is the calculated safflower price that has been indexed to wheat. PwT is the price of wheat at
time T following a random walk under a fitted RiskGARCH time-series model developed from
20 years of historical data. The time-series model includes a correl matrix to adjust for a 0.82
correlation between safflower and wheat prices and has been detrended to remove any price bias.
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PwT-1 is the previous year’s price. After comparing several autoregressive models using the past
20 years of wheat price data, it was determined that only wheat prices the year prior were
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. An AR-1 model is the most appropriate method of
developing the wheat price index.
(4)
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑜 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑝 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇)

(4.1)
𝑛

= ∑ [(𝜃) ∗ (

(((𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ∗ 0.9) − ((𝑀𝑓𝑇 + 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑇 )

𝑇=1

(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

− (𝐶𝑇−1 ) + (𝐴 𝑇−1 ))]

(4.2)
𝑛

= ∑ [(1 − 𝜃) ∗ (

(((𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ) − (𝐴 𝑇−1 ) − ((𝑀𝑓𝑇 + 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )) − 𝐶𝑇 )

𝑇=1

(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

− (𝐶𝑇−1 ) + (𝐴 𝑇−1 ))]

where:
𝐼𝑓 𝑌𝑇 ≤ 0.41 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜃 = 1. Producer payoff NPV is calculated using Eq. 4.1.
𝐼𝑓 𝑌𝑇 > 0.41 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜃 = 0. Producer payoff NPV is calculated using Eq. 4.2.
AT-1 is the acreage payment calculated as 𝐴𝑇−1 = ((𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗ 0.41) ∗ 0.1)

9.2 Processor Payoff Functions
Processor payoffs were defined as the net present value returns per ton of safflower regardless of
the final processing state, which includes birdseed, meal, and oil. Due to the difficulty of
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establishing reliable data, it is assumed that MSO is risk neutral unless otherwise specified. It is
also assumed that the processing facility and accompanying machinery have already been
established, and no initial investment is modeled in the cash-flow table. The discount rate was
held constant at 10 percent.
Processor payoffs according to payment mechanism alternative were defined as follows for spot
market or no contract (Eq. 5), fixed price performance payment (Eq. 6), indexed price
performance payment (Eq. 7), and a combination lump sum and fixed price payment (Eq. 8).

(5)
𝑃𝑝𝑝
(𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑇 − ( 𝑌 𝑇 ) − 𝑂𝑐𝑇 )
𝑇
= ∑
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡)

𝑇=1

where:
𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑻 = (𝑃𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )

PpsT is the price received for processed safflower from wholesalers and retailers following a
triangular distribution with a min $800, a max of $1200, or approximately 20 percent volatility,
and a mean expected value of $1000 per ton. PppT is the price paid to the producer for raw
safflower seed $/acre. OcT is the operating cost of processing safflower at the mill following a
triangular distribution with a min $125, max $375, or approximately 50 percent volatility, and an
expected mean value of $250 per ton, all other notation as outlined in Section 9.1.
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(6)
𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇) = ∑
𝑇=1

(𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑇 − ((𝑃𝑓𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ) − 𝑂𝑐𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

(7)
𝑃𝑝𝑝
(𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑇 − ( 𝑌 𝑇 ) − 𝑂𝑐𝑇 )
𝑇
=∑
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇
𝑛

𝑁𝑃𝑉( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇)

𝑇=1

where:
𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑻 = ((𝑃𝑠𝑇 + 𝑅𝑇 − 𝑀𝑓𝑇 − 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )
Note: Observe the change from the price distribution PT in Eq. 5 to the price distribution PsT.

(8)
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑜 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑝 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑇)
(8.1)
𝑛

= ∑ [(𝜃) ∗ (
𝑇=1

(𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑇 − ((𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ∗ 0.9) − ((𝑀𝑓𝑇 + 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )) − 𝑂𝑐𝑇 )
− (𝐴𝑇−1 ))]
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

(8.2)
𝑛

= ∑ [(1 − 𝜃) ∗ (
𝑇=1

(𝑃𝑝𝑠𝑇 − ((𝑃𝑓𝑇 ∗ 𝑌𝑇 ∗ 0.9) − (𝐴 𝑇−1 ) − ((𝑀𝑓𝑇 + 𝐷𝑓𝑇 ) ∗ 𝑌𝑇 )) − 𝑂𝑐𝑇 )
− (𝐴 𝑇−1 ))]
(1 + 𝑟)𝑇

Page | 32

where:
𝐼𝑓 𝑌𝑇 ≤ 0.41 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜃 = 1. Processor payoff NPV is calculated using Eq. 8.1.
𝐼𝑓 𝑌𝑇 > 0.41 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜃 = 0. Processor payoff NPV is calculated using Eq. 8.2.
All other notations are as previously outlined.

10 Simulation Results
Variability in net returns results from yield, price, and cost risk, with some price movement
attributable to quality constraints. Stochastic simulation in @Risk (Palisade Corp. 2022) was
used to simulate the alternative contracting strategy payoffs for safflower growers and
processors in the Intermountain West.
For both parties, a cash flow summary table was created for each of the four contract structures
to simulate safflower payoff NPV under the alternative contracting constraints over one year
(Appendix C, Appendix D). The cumulative density function output graphs (Fig. 7 and Fig. 9)
and the summary statistics found in Table 5 were used to compare contract structures to
determine which best minimized risk, renegotiation, and moral hazard while observing the
constraints and maximizing profits for both the producer and Mountain States Oilseeds. Recall
that the first objective is to minimize downside risk, and the second is to maximize upside
potential.
10.1 Results Overview

The spot market or no contract scenario is the base case where no payment mechanisms or
contracting constraints are imposed upon either the farmer or MSO. All other simulated
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mechanisms are evaluated first relative to the spot market model and then to the other
alternatives.
Table 5. Simulation Output Statistics: Producer and Processor NPV Payoff Distributions Under
Various Contract Scenarios
Producer Distributions ($/Acre)
Spot
Fixed
Indexed
Combo
Market Pmt.
Pmt.
Lump
Sum

Processor Distributions ($/Ton)
Spot
Fixed
Indexed
Combo
Market
Pmt.
Pmt.
Lump
Sum

Mean

$34.78

$34.75

$44.13

$39.07

$152.12

$152.12

$128.50

$144.19

S.D.

$48.70

$30.23

$50.89

$28.42

$129.82

$88.48

$132.69

$88.04

Prob.
NPV<0

23.2%

12.1%

19.2%

8.9%

12.1%

4.4%

16.6%

5.3%

Min.

-$157.43

-$154.39

-$165.80

-$129.93

-$297.97

-$107.57

-$369.56

-$118.50

Max.

$232.25

$114.31

$229.53

$109.62

$611.95

$411.51

$530.86

$412.53

Skew.

0.0309

-0.9136

0.0272

-0.7556

0.0217

0.0137

-0.0104

0.0351

Kurt.

3.0831

4.5623

3.4521

4.7114

2.9304

2.6262

2.9110

2.7384

1%

-$79.41

-$58.04

-$72.98

-$44.49

-$149.29

-$43.56

-$180.66

-$54.69

5%

-$45.62

-$20.66

-$38.46

-$12.16

-$63.16

$6.00

-$87.16

-$1.41

10%

-$26.46

-$4.43

-$20.20

$2.24

-$14.68

$36.02

-$42.82

$32.39

10.2 Producer Analysis

Expected returns were highest for the producer under the combination lump and fixed price
payment at $39.07 per acre. Variability was lowest for that payment structure (SD=$28.42/acre)
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and greatest for the indexed price performance payment (SD=$50.89/acre). It is also high for the
spot market scenario (SD=$ 48.70).

Distributions for a producer using alternative payment structures were negatively skewed under
the fixed price payment and the combination payment contract conditions. Defined: the more
negative skewness a distribution exhibits, the more likely it is to achieve a return lower than the
mean. There is a lower probability of receiving large payments from the right tails of their
respective distributions for these two contracts. The fixed performance price and the combination
payment had a kurtosis above 4, suggesting that these distributions tended to be more spiked than
a normal distribution. Distributions with more kurtosis are more likely to draw values near the
mean. Therefore, both structures exhibit less upside opportunity but do well at reducing
downside risk and increasing the likelihood of payoff values near the mean.

Figure 7: Producer Expected NPV $/Acre Payoff Distribution Comparison
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Growers, in this case, are assumed to be risk-averse. Consequently, the combination lump sum
and fixed price contract could conceivably be the most acceptable based on the minimized NPV
variation of 𝜎 $28.42 and an 8.9% probability of returns less than $0. It also gives a higher
expected payoff amount per acre than either the fixed price or spot market scenarios. While the
indexed contract may offer more considerable topside opportunities, the combo structure has the
best per-acre returns on average for the least amount of downside risk and price volatility.

Paradoxically a lump sum payment may introduce a slight chance of moral hazard where the
producer is not incentivized to implement best management practices. However, this contract
structure provides compelling evidence that further investigation is required. The combination
contract successfully mitigates price risk. It also provides insurance against yield risk for the
producer, persuasively contending for MSO’s consideration. Given the uncertainty surrounding
the implementation of a combination contract, and the nearly identical downside risk-shaping

Figure 8: Producer Fixed Price Performance Payment Change in Contribution to NPV Variance
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capability of the fixed price performance payment, the latter contract is the best option for the
producer in this study.
Figure 8 illustrates how each variable’s contribution to NPV variance changes between a
producer selling on the spot market and one using a fixed price contract. Most significant is the
reduction in price volatility. A grower selling raw safflower seed on the spot market can expect
60.6 percent of their expected payment per acre change to be attributable to 2022 safflower seed
prices $/ton. By fixing the price to $600.00 per ton, MSO can eliminate price uncertainty for the
producer. Payoff outcomes are then dependent on other stochastic risks, and safflower yield per
acre becomes the most impactful determinant of the grower’s expected NPV payoff, which
places the profitable success of the enterprise squarely on the shoulders of the operator.

Moreover, this structure also minimizes the probability of moral hazard because payoffs are
directly tied to performance objectives. Nevertheless, there is some renegotiation risk because
the plasticity of the spot market is firmly truncated through the proposed mechanism. Though
protected from significant losses because of the provisional price floor, weighty market changes
not foreseen at the signing of the contract could be the impetus for paltered contract terms. In
reality, this concern is inconsequential. Predicated on the current safflower processing landscape
where there are few processors, and the producer has little negotiating power.

The indexed price performance payment initially appears promising, with an NPV of $44.13,
almost $10.00 more than the spot market scenario. The indexed contract is stochastically more
efficient than selling seed on the spot market because safflower prices are subject to the market
attributes of wheat, which has more extensive upside opportunities. Upon closer inspection, it is
clear that the indexed structure also introduces more price volatility to safflower with a $2.19, or
Page | 37

4.22 percent, increase in the standard deviation. The downside risk is only minimally impacted,
making the fixed price contract much more attractive to the risk-averse grower.
10.3 Processor Analysis

The processor's expected net present returns were highest under a fixed price performance
payment at $152.12 per ton. Variability was lowest for the combination lump sum and fixed
price payment (SD=$88.04) and most significant for seed purchases made under the indexed
price performance contract (SD=$132.69). The spot market also experienced high variability
(SD=$129.82).

Figure 9: Processor Expected NPV $/Ton Payoff Distribution Comparison

Except for the indexed price, distributions for the processor under alternative contract structures
were all positively skewed. In all scenarios, kurtosis was valued near 3, suggesting that the
output distributions were shaped no more or less differently than a normal distribution.
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Because the index contract ties raw safflower seed prices directly to wheat prices, it is crucial to
understand how wheat prices have moved historically. While one cannot perfectly predict the
future, the fitted distributions illustrated in Figure 10 concisely depict what movements
processors and producers can expect on average from wheat prices.

Figure 10: Comparative CDF of Historical Percent Changes in Wheat and Safflower Prices

The CDF Figure 10 indicates a better than 60 percent chance that wheat prices will move higher;
thus, the indexed payment favors the producer, but there is still a 37.6 percent chance that prices
will drop, which favors Mountain States Oilseeds.
For the processor, the indexed contract provides lower downside risk protection than the fixed
price contract because the firm is taking on a higher proportion of the price risk relative to the
producer. MSO is looking to incentivize grower participation in safflower production. Therefore,
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the indexed payment does not sufficiently provide against downside risk and price volatility, and
other contracts are found to be superior.
For Mountain States Oilseeds, the fixed performance price contract effectively reduces volatility
by 7.7 percent relative to the spot market while maintaining a positive expected NPV. It is an
excellent option to protect the processor from unexpectedly high prices, meaning that downside
risk is secured. A combo lump sum, fixed price structure can result in similar returns, making it a
strong candidate for consideration. Once again, due to the theoretical uncertainties that exist in
the combination contract, it is left for future investigation.

Figure 11: Processor Fixed Price Performance Payment Change in Contribution to NPV Variance

The fixed price performance payment is the preferred choice for Mountain States Oilseeds. As
the preferred contract mechanism for producers, it will be easier to obtain sufficient safflower
seed quantities to keep the mill running and fill wholesale orders while also controlling the
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downside risks inherent in purchasing on the spot market. Figure 11 illustrates the changes
effected on NPV variance by engaging in the fixed contract relative to the spot market.

11 Future Research Efforts
This study aimed to identify the risks faced by both the processor and producer and to select a
contractual design mechanism to minimize those risks and maximize profit under the specified
conditions. Mountain States Oilseeds established the primary objective to incentivize grower
participation. Thus, this model assumed that MSO would remain risk neutral unless otherwise
specified. Based on that assumption, it was hypothesized that because safflower exhibits such
thin margins, price risk would be the farmers' most significant shaper of the output distribution.
Emphasis was placed on pricing mechanisms within the contract that would reduce price risk for
the grower.
11.1 Approach to Price, Yield, and Cost Risk
The model illustrated that yield differences between safflower production in the Great Plains and
California areas versus the Intermountain West are highly significant. Under a spot market
scenario where no contract is employed, 32.4 percent of the expected NPV variation for
safflower production is attributable to yield basis due to geographic location. Historically, Idaho
has experienced a -38 percent average yield differential relative to the most recent 10-year
national average.
Furthermore, costs incurred 4.5 percent of the NPV variation. Though price volatility
significantly contributes to NPV variation at 61.6 percent, the combined cost and yield risks still
account for 37.1 percent of total safflower production volatility. Thus, the initial expectation that
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prices would drive NPV risk for safflower was correct. However, instituting alternative price
mechanisms that reduce yield and cost risks can have a measurable impact on the economic
viability of safflower production.
Further investigation is necessary to adjust MSO’s contract strategy to comprehensively address
the risks in resource-scarce locations. Potential avenues of study could include (1)
implementation of educational programs teaching safflower best management practices to
improve the effectiveness of resource allocation, (2) input subsidization by MSO to reduce
grower costs and improve marginal revenue, (3) contracting for higher processed safflower
prices with wholesalers and retailers because of Idaho’s comparative advantage in producing
birdseed quality safflower.
This model did not assess a risk premium for the transfer of risk from the producer to Mountain
States Oilseeds. Due to the thin margins experienced by safflower growers, risk premiums could
only be exacted at a few dollars before contracts became undesirable for grower participation.
While producers were extremely sensitive to changes in risk premiums, MSO was not. It was
determined to remove risk premiums from the model as they tended to obscure the results.
Further research should be conducted to model how Mountain States Oilseeds might be
compensated for taking on the largest share of the price-risk burden.
11.2 Utility Theory
An area of research that could prove immensely beneficial to the study of contracting in
safflower is the addition of the subjective expected utility theory (SEU). The theory characterizes
the qualitative behavior of decision-makers concerning the attractiveness of an economic
opportunity as perceived in the presence of risk.
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This paper made the simple yet naïve assumption that all safflower growers are risk averse and
all processors are risk neutral. The results were then applied to select the payment mechanism
that most effectively reduced grower risk while maintaining the conditions necessary for MSO to
meet the constraints of its wholesale contracts. Under the SEU, the model could more
dynamically approach the question of contract choice.
Furthermore, a stochastic dominance with respect to a function (SDRF) framework could be
employed to analyze the simulation cumulative density functions and order risky alternatives by
their certainty equivalents, the same as partial ordering by utility values. Hardaker and Lien
(2003) provide a concise approach to stochastic efficiency analysis methods with risk aversion
bounds. Wilson and Dahl (2011) compared net return distributions utilizing the stochastic
efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) method to “determine risk-efficient rankings and to
examine effects of risk aversion on preferences.”
11.3 Expanded Contract Provisions
The alternative payment mechanisms investigated hitherto are by no means an exhaustive list of
potential contract structures. The scope of the paper was an attempt to understand various
standard payment forms and their broad relationship to price risk. Understanding how they each
interact with safflower prices generally facilitates more nuanced contract development centered
on the geographical, economic, and financial feasibility attributes of the Intermountain area.
The model found that a fixed price performance payment had the highest expected NPV and was
the most effective at reducing NPV variation for producers and processors. Alternatively, one
could define a contract with a min/max provision for the price spread instead of fixing the price
level. No formal futures market exists, and virtually no research has been conducted on crossPage | 43

hedging optimality in safflower. Consequently, the suggested hypothetical contract would
synthetically introduce put and call options that exhibit the flexibility of an indexed price while
protecting both producer and processor from extreme highs and lows.
Real-world safflower contracts are negotiated at the beginning of each production year.
Producers can quickly move in and out of safflower production from year to year, in some
regions, several times throughout the year. A real options analysis could prove supremely
beneficial to the current model as it would assess the impact of periodical renegotiation
commonly expected in the industry. Du and Hennessey (2011) provide a clear structure for
evaluating real options in land rent contracts by applying Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
11.4 RMA Crop Insurance
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) is the crop insurance arm of the USDA. Crop insurance
has become an important risk management tool in modern-day agriculture. This paper included
stochastic costs for producer participation in the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program
(NAP), which covers low yield, loss of inventory, or prevented planting caused by natural
disasters. Nevertheless, assumed costs are negligible at $1.24 an acre, and this model did not
attempt to address insurance payouts under adverse conditions.
As noted in Section 11.1, lower yields in the Intermountain region provide a significant source of
volatility. The RMA offers several other insurance products that might be explored to resolve
other production risks such that farmers are more likely to add safflower to their enterprise
rotations. Though MSO does not supply insurance products, education on the current USDA
programs could improve the buyer-producer relationship and give Mountain States Oilseeds an
edge over competitors in the contracting process.
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12 Conclusion
Challenging economic and climate conditions have Jason Godfrey and Mountain States Oilseeds
searching for innovative ways to secure a steady supply of quality raw safflower seed to their
processing facilities. Preplant agricultural contracts have always played a role in safflower
production, but contract mechanisms that are empirically tested and theoretically supported are
becoming more critical in the current agricultural environment.
Factors contributing to increased instability for MSO include reduced global seed supply and
increased production costs from war-torn Eastern Europe, climate change and constricting water
availability, urban creep and the loss of productive acreage for which intercrop competition is
intense, and crop rotation traditions fiercely held by a farm ownership demographic averaging 60
years old (Census of Agriculture 2017).
This study aimed to develop a model to analyze alternative contracting strategies focused
primarily on payment mechanisms in the case of safflower seed and evaluate their risk and
returns for growers and Mountain States Oilseeds. Development of the empirical model, though
applied specifically to raw safflower seed, has important implications for crops that exhibit
similar characteristics. Oilseeds like mustard, flax, and sunflowers, among other crops like peas
and lentils, also have more significant risks and narrower margins than competing crops and
have little access to traditional risk management tools.
The model results indicate that safflower has a relatively high risk compared to other competing
crops despite high price expectations in 2022. Numerous variables contribute to the
precariousness of the oilseed, but yield, cost, and price risks are significant. Payment structures
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that employ a fixed or combination lump sum, fixed price can reduce the variability of producer
returns by increasing average returns and limiting the effects of lower prices.
It was found that a fixed price performance payment contract most effectively reduced producer
risk while minimizing price volatility for Mountain States Oilseeds. The producer-preferred
agreement shifts more risk onto the processing firm, ensuring that prices are guaranteed early in
the year. For the processor, using a fixed price provides quality adjustments and participation
incentives that mitigate the moral hazard, improving MSO’s ability to fulfill its processing
agreements.
Most importantly, the model supplied evidence that the previous understanding and emphasis on
price risk management within safflower contracting does not entirely address the lurking, less
apparent sources of return volatility which are cost and yield, especially for varieties cultivated
in Utah and Idaho. The aforementioned combination lump sum and fixed price contract offers
provocative attestation that both price and yield risks can be managed without undermining the
integrity of MSO’s risk profile.
Many types of additional provisions could be included in the contract. This study evaluated four
pricing formulas and provided a springboard for further investigation into pricing schemes, yield
and cost risks, crop insurance, real options, and the implementation of utility functions to more
precisely model principal/buyer risk aversion. As there is yet little research in this crop sector,
researchers may find this simulated analysis, both its limitations and its conclusions, a beneficial
starting point for developing and refining risk management strategies for safflower production in
the Intermountain West.
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Appendix A

Costs of Non-Irrigated Safflower
Quantity per
acre

46-0-0 Urea
Application
Sonalan (ethalfluralin)
Application

Northern Utah

Unit

Price per
Unit

Value per
Acre

40
1

Units
Acre

$0.56
$5.00

2
1
18
1

Pints
Acre
Lbs.
Acre

$8.79
$5.00
$0.34
$8.56

$22.40
$5.00
$0.00
$17.58
$5.00
$6.12
$8.56
$1.25

Sub
Total

Total

Inputs and Services
Fertilizer

Herbicides

Seed
Labor
Crop Insurance (NAP)
Subtotal Inputs and Services
Field Operations
Fall Chisel Plow
Spring Chisel Plow
Planting
Harvesting
Hauling
Subtotal Field Operations Cost
Interest on Operating Capital

$65.91
Times
1
1
1
1
1150

Unit
Acre
Acre
Acre
Acre
Lbs.

Per Unit
$11.00
$11.00
$12.00
$25.00
$0.01

Acre
$11.00
$11.00
$12.00
$25.00
$11.50
$70.50

Rate
5%

Term
0.5

Principle
$132.91

$3.32

Total Input, Service and Field Operation Costs

$139.73

Overhead
Accounting, Liability Insurance, Vehicle Cost, Office Expense
Cash Lease for Land (includes propery tax)

$10.00
$35.00

Total Overhead

$45.00

Total Costs

$184.73

Note: Cost Budget for Non-Irrigated Safflower (Pace et al. 2019). Crop budgets specific to Idaho were not available for safflower so the most
recent Northern Utah budget was substituted due to the region’s proximity and similarities to Idaho safflower acreage.
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Appendix B
Map 1: 2022 Safflower Acres Harvested

600 mi. Supply Radius
MSO Processing
Facilities
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Appendix C
Table 6. Producer Discounted Cashflows- Spot Market Scenario
Estimated
Estimated Yield
Price Mechanism Year
Price ($/ton)
(tons/acre)
Spot Market

2022

$600.00

0.41

Cost at Time
T ($/acre)

Cost at Time T-1
($/acre)

NPV
($/acre)

$81.96

$102.77

$34.75*

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 7. Producer Discounted Cashflows- Fixed Price Performance Payment Scenario
Fixed Price
Estimated Yield Cost at Time
Price Mechanism
Year
($/ton)
(tons/acre)
T ($/acre)
Fixed Price Performance
2022
$600.00
0.41
$81.96
Payment

Cost at Time T-1
($/acre)

NPV
($/acre)

$102.77

$34.75*

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 8. Producer Discounted Cashflows- Indexed Price Performance Payment Scenario
Indexed
Estimated Yield Wheat Price Cost at Time
Price Mechanism
Year
Price ($/ton)
(tons/acre)
($/ton)
T ($/acre)
Indexed Price
2022
$623.56
0.41
$236.95
$81.96
Performance Payment

Cost at Time
T-1 ($/acre)

NPV
($/acre)

$102.77

$43.19*

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 9. Producer Discounted Cashflows- Combo Lump Sum and Fixed Price Payment Scenario
Price Mechanism
Combo Lump Sum and
Fixed Price Payment

Year
2022

Fixed Price Acreage Pmt. Estimated Yield
($/ton)
($/acre)
(tons/acre)
$522.67

$24.72

0.41

Cost at Time
T ($/acre)

Cost at Time
T-1 ($/acre)

NPV
($/acre)

$81.96

$102.77

$37.97*

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.
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Appendix D
Table 10. Processor Discounted Cashflows- Spot Market Scenario
Price Mechanism

Year

Price Paid to
Producer ($/ton)

Estimated Processing
Cost ($/ton)

Estimated Price
Received ($/ton)

Expected
Revenue ($/ton)

NPV
($/ton)

Spot Market

2022

$582.67*

$250.00

$1,000.00

$167.33

$152.12

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 11. Processor Discounted Cashflows- Fixed Price Performance Payment Scenario
Price Mechanism
Fixed Price
Performance Payment

Year

Price Paid to
Producer ($/ton)

Estimated Processing
Cost ($/ton)

Estimated Price
Received ($/ton)

Expected
Revenue ($/ton)

NPV
($/ton)

2022

$582.67*

$250.00

$1,000.00

$167.33

$152.12

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 12. Processor Discounted Cashflows- Indexed Price Performance Payment Scenario
Price Mechanism
Indexed Price
Performance Payment

Year

Price Paid to
Producer ($/ton)

Estimated Processing
Cost ($/ton)

Estimated Price
Received ($/ton)

Expected
Revenue ($/ton)

NPV
($/ton)

2022

$606.22*

$250.00

$1,000.00

$143.78

$130.71

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.

Table 13. Processor Discounted Cashflow- Combo Lump Sum and Fixed Price Payment Scenario
Price Mechanism
Combo Lump Sum and
Fixed Price Payment

Year

Price Paid to
Producer ($/ton)

Acreage Pmt.
($/acre)

Estimated Processing
Cost ($/ton)

Estimated Price
Received ($/ton)

NPV
($/ton)

2022

$522.67*

$24.72

$250.00

$1,000.00

$146.67

*Note: Price reflects an adjustment for stochastic quality defects at the mean.
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Appendix E
2022/Processor Combo Lump and Fixed Price PMT Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14,
2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$118.50
$412.53
$144.19
$88.04
7,751
0.0351
2.7384
$143.75
$157.94
-$1.41
5%
$289.39
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$54.69
-$26.03
-$1.41
$32.39
$68.17
$82.12
$143.75
$205.57
$219.59
$259.49
$289.39
$315.78
$347.99

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5

2022 / Price Received for Processed Se...
2022 / Operating Cost $/Ton
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee
Idaho Avg. Safflower Yield

Contribution
71.3%
-27.8%
0.5%
0.3%
-0.1%
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2022/Processor Indexed Price Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$369.56
$530.86
$128.50
$132.69
17,605
-0.0104
2.9110
$128.17
$160.49
-$87.16
5%
$347.79
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$180.66
-$124.10
-$87.16
-$42.82
$15.74
$36.90
$128.17
$218.15
$241.48
$301.30
$347.79
$388.39
$430.70

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5

Wheat - PRICE RECEIVED- Real $ / Ton
2022 / Price Received for Processed Se...
2022 / Operating Cost $/Ton
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
-57.0%
30.5%
-12.2%
0.2%
0.1%
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2022/Processor Fixed Payment Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$107.57
$411.51
$152.12
$88.48
7,828
0.0137
2.6262
$150.99
$105.27
$6.00
5%
$298.70
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$43.56
-$19.19
$6.00
$36.02
$75.07
$90.49
$150.99
$214.93
$230.04
$270.13
$298.70
$322.63
$350.22

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4

2022 / Price Received for Processed Se...
2022 / Operating Cost $/Ton
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
71.8%
-27.4%
0.5%
0.3%
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2022/Processor Spot Market Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$297.97
$611.95
$152.12
$129.82
16,854
0.0217
2.9304
$151.71
$192.59
-$63.16
5%
$365.87
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$149.29
-$102.37
-$63.16
-$14.68
$42.67
$64.86
$151.71
$239.43
$260.86
$319.26
$365.87
$412.18
$460.78

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5

2022 / Price Paid to the Producer $/Ton
2022 / Price Received for Processed Se...
2022 / Operating Cost $/Ton
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
-53.8%
33.0%
-12.8%
0.2%
0.2%
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2022/ Producer Combo Lump and Fixed Payment Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$129.93
$109.62
$39.07
$28.42
807.8
-0.7556
4.2297
$42.20
$48.52
-$12.16
5%
$80.21
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$44.49
-$25.50
-$12.16
$2.24
$16.98
$22.45
$42.20
$58.74
$62.68
$72.94
$80.21
$85.66
$91.92

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5

Idaho Avg. Safflower Yield
2022 / Cost at Time T-1 $/Acre
2022 / Cost at Time T $/Acre
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
82.5%
-11.1%
-5.1%
-0.7%
-0.5%
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2022 / Producer Indexed Price Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$165.80
$229.53
$44.13
$50.89
2,589
0.0272
3.0461
$43.48
$40.47
-$38.46
5%
$127.87
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$72.98
-$53.66
-$38.46
-$20.20
$1.13
$8.98
$43.48
$78.66
$87.81
$109.18
$127.87
$141.57
$165.45

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5
6

Wheat - PRICE RECEIVED- Real $ / Ton
Idaho Avg. Safflower Yield
2022 / Cost at Time T-1 $/Acre
2022 / Cost at Time T $/Acre
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
61.4%
32.2%
-3.3%
-1.6%
-0.2%
-0.2%
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2022 / Producer Fixed Price Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$154.39
$114.31
$34.75
$30.23
914.0
-0.9136
4.7807
$38.28
$35.89
-$20.66
5%
$77.04
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$58.04
-$34.99
-$20.66
-$4.43
$12.68
$18.42
$38.28
$55.80
$59.52
$69.43
$77.04
$83.07
$88.98

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5

Idaho Avg. Safflower Yield
2022 / Cost at Time T-1 $/Acre
2022 / Cost at Time T $/Acre
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
84.6%
-9.9%
-4.5%
-0.6%
-0.4%
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2022 / Producer Spot Market Expected NPV
Report:
Performed By:
Date:

Compact Output Report
Jameson Packer
Wednesday, December 14, 2022

Summary Statistics
Statistic

Value

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Median
Mode
Left X
Left P
Right X
Right P

-$157.43
$232.25
$34.78
$48.70
2,372
0.0309
3.0826
$33.90
$28.32
-$45.62
5%
$114.63
95%

Percentiles
Percentile
1%
2.5%
5%
10%
20%
25%
50%
75%
80%
90%
95%
97.5%
99%

Value
-$79.41
-$59.72
-$45.62
-$26.46
-$6.24
$2.61
$33.90
$67.75
$76.18
$97.20
$114.63
$131.62
$148.85

Contribution To Variance
Rank

Name

1
2
3
4
5
6

2022 / Price Paid to the Producer $/Ton
Idaho Avg. Safflower Yield
2022 / Cost at Time T-1 $/Acre
2022 / Cost at Time T $/Acre
Dockage_Fee
Moisture_Fee

Contribution
60.6%
32.3%
-3.8%
-1.8%
-0.2%
-0.2%
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